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McDOWELL AND TYLER

IN THE

Campaign of Bull Run

JAMES B. FRY.

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MCDOWELL AND TYLER

IN THE

CAMPAIGN OF BULL RUN

◇ 1861. ◇

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
JAMES B. FRY,

RETIRED.

Assistant Adj't-General, with Rank of Colonel.

Brevet-Major-General U. S. A.

Adj't-Gen'l to Gen'l McDowell, from May to Nov., '61.



NEW YORK:

D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER,

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PREFACE.

A MEMORIAL volume of the late General Daniel Tyler contains an account by him of the Bull Run campaign of 1861. This account does great wrong to the commanding General in that campaign. The volume is edited by the distinguished author Donald G. Mitchel. The title page says that "two hundred copies of this volume have been privately printed by Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, New Haven." It is stated in the preface that "the volume opens with a fragment of autobiography written at the instance of his esteemed friend Major-General George W. Cullum, who proposed preparing from it his biography for the West Point Alumni Association. This fact will explain its comparative reticence with respect to his private life, and its fullness in military and engineering details. It is believed that he had fully intended its completion, but the cares of business and the infirmities of age unfortunately forbade. Yet his friends will recognize in this fragment his straightforwardness; his sturdy outspoken positiveness of opinion; his ever-active energy; and they will not be sorry to see, in this record of his, traces of his courage in maintaining his own convictions—of his directness

of speech, and of his honest wrath at what he counted (perhaps sometimes hastily) vaporous incompetence, wherever encountered."

The contents of memorial volumes privately printed are not, usually, proper subjects for criticism. But this is an exception. *De mortuis nil nisi bonum* is a worthy maxim; but the living are entitled to something. General Tyler wrote an account of the campaign of Bull Run, and sent it to General Cullum for history. General Cullum has not published it, but it has been printed, distributed, deposited in public libraries, and reviewed in at least one newspaper. The subject treated by General Tyler is public, historic and important. For the foregoing reasons it has been deemed fair to subject his Autobiography to examination by the records, notwithstanding he is dead and his contribution to history appears in a memorial volume. When a man writing of those associated with him in the defence of his country, makes defamatory allegations which are contradicted by official reports and sworn statements—his own among them, recorded twenty years before—dead or alive, his mistakes should be pointed out.

J. B. F.

NEW YORK CITY, *May*, 1884.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE New York *Evening Post* some weeks ago contained a communication entitled "New Memoirs of the War of the Rebellion"—"Reminiscences of a Gallant Soldier." Under these striking captions a review was given of what is called a memorial volume, "in part an autobiography of the late General Daniel Tyler." The printing of this volume, it is said in the *Post*, "illustrates and confirms the correctness of a remark often made, that the true and full history of the War of the Rebellion cannot be written until sufficient time has elapsed to allow the many diaries, letters and private papers of the chief participants in its stirring scenes to be made accessible, consequent upon their death, to the general public. For this volume contains a new and unpublished account of the first battle of Bull Run, July 20, 1861" (should be 21), "and of the preceding skirmish of Blackburn's Ford, July 17" (should be 18), "written by the subject of this memoir, who, it will be remembered, was in immediate command of the troops engaged in the skirmish, and second

in command under McDowell on the day of the battle." It is due to McDowell, as well as to history, that the account of Blackburn's Ford and Bull Run here mentioned, written by Tyler himself, under date of May 1, 1881, to be used after his death, and now given to the "general public" by his friends, should be somewhat carefully considered. It is strange that a man of Tyler's ability and experience could, without referring to the records, write, in his memoir, an account of military operations which took place nearly twenty years before. Feeling some apprehension in writing from memory, he says: "This ends my recollections of the battle of Bull Run, and of my official connection therewith. Since it is now some twenty-three" (it was not twenty) "years since this unfortunate battle was fought, I may have made some mistakes, although I think not; but before completing this memoir I purpose to examine the official reports of that battle, converse with such officers as were connected with me in the contest, and correct any mistakes or errors which may be contained in this part of my memoirs." That he did not succeed in correcting all the mistakes and errors, if he made any examination at all, will appear further on.

McDOWELL—HIS APPOINTMENT— HIS ARMY—TYLER.

WHEN the year 1861 opened, McDowell, forty-three years of age, and in the full vigor of manhood, was a major in the Adjutant-General's Department. His habits were unexceptionable, and he was blessed with good health and great physical power. Schooled, as a youth, in France, and graduated from the Military Academy (1838), he was always a close student of his profession, and was well informed upon general subjects, but was without political antecedents or acquaintances. He was one of the most active soldiers of his day and gained distinction in the Mexican War. Full of energy and patriotism, when the crisis approached in 1861, he was positive in his opinions and clear and forcible in the expression of them. He insisted that all efforts to conciliate would fail, that the Southern States, one after another, would be dragged into secession, that war was inevitable, and that it was the plain duty of the

government to prepare for it with all possible dispatch. He was on duty in Washington inspecting the regular troops assembled there prior to the inauguration of President Lincoln. Highly esteemed by General Scott and gaining the confidence and friendship of Secretary Chase, it is not strange that McDowell was the first junior officer to attract attention from that administration which met rebellion at the threshold of the White House on the 4th of March, 1861. He was assigned to mustering and organizing the militia of the district, and was in command of the Capital during part of April and May. The seventy-five thousand three-months' men called for by the President's proclamation of the 15th of April were assembling at the Capital, and it was necessary to have commanders for them. McDowell was appointed Brigadier-General in the regular army, May 14, 1861. Prior to that, Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield, Inspector-General, an officer in whom General Scott reposed great confidence, was assigned to command in Washington. Mansfield was McDowell's senior. He entered the army in 1822, and held the grade of colonel, whereas McDowell entered in 1838, and (prior to his selection for brigadier) was only a major. Though he thought highly of McDowell, General Scott was not in favor of his sudden advancement to the grade of brigadier-general, and was quite

unwilling that he should be put above Mansfield. As soon, therefore, as practicable after the President promoted McDowell, General Scott insisted that Mansfield should be promoted to the same grade with the same date (May 14), thus preserving the military superiority of the latter. The Secretary of War expressed to McDowell a purpose to appoint him Major-General, but McDowell was unwilling under the circumstances to accept so high a grade.

After the troops had been thrown across the Potomac by Mansfield during the night of May 23-4, General Scott was told that he must send either Mansfield or McDowell there to command. He did not wish to send either, but was wholly unwilling to relieve Mansfield from command in Washington. Hence he ordered McDowell. But he advised McDowell to make a personal request of the Secretary of War not to be assigned to that command. McDowell thought he could not do that. He had just been appointed a General Officer, and he felt bound to enter promptly and cheerfully upon the first duty to which the government assigned him. His refusal piqued General Scott, and created, on his part, a coldness towards McDowell.

The enemy was at that time concentrating south of the Potomac almost in sight of the dome of the Capitol. McDowell's assignment

not only deprived Mansfield of a part of his command, but of the most conspicuous part, that in front of the foe. A little jealousy of McDowell arose in the army circles about the headquarters of General Scott, and Mansfield himself was dissatisfied. In his diary of Sept. 8, 1862, Secretary Chase made the entry, "General Mansfield came in and talked very earnestly. * * He spoke of Gen. Scott, said he had not treated him well; had placed McDowell in command over the river last year, superseding himself. * * He felt himself wronged, but did his duty to the best of his ability," etc. (Warden's "An account of the private and public services of Salmon P. Chase," p. 466.)

As the Union forces arrived in Washington from the north they necessarily reported to Mansfield, and became for the time a part of his command. He attended diligently to the duty of equipping and preparing the troops for the field, but every officer and enlisted man who was sent across the Potomac changed the relieved importance of Mansfield and McDowell by reducing the command of the former and increasing that of the latter. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, McDowell says: "General Mansfield felt hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command he had divided in two and a portion sent over

there. I got everything with great difficulty. Some of my regiments came over very late ; some of them not until the very day I was to move the army." When he appealed to Mansfield to hurry forward the troops, the excuse was they were not supplied with baggage wagons. When this was reported to the Quartermaster General, his answer was that he could furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did not think that should move. The

ERRATA.

Page 10 ; seventh line from bottom, for "relieved" read "relative."

Page 40 ; top line, for "latent" read "talent."

his wants partially supplied. He failed to secure transportation to carry rations with his army, and had to march trusting that wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with provisions and sent to follow him.

He met with much difficulty in getting officers of experience to command divisions and brigades. His division commanders were, Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.; Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon, New Jersey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman and Miles of the regular army.

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there. I got everything with great difficulty. Some of my regiments came over very late ; some of them not until the very day I was to move the army." When he appealed to Mansfield to hurry forward the troops, the excuse was they were not supplied with baggage wagons. When this was reported to the Quartermaster General, his answer was that he could furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did not want it till the troops should move. The result was, the troops which McDowell was to lead had not all been sent to him by Mansfield before the day fixed by General Scott for McDowell's advance. Some of them did not join until the Sunday before he advanced, and some not until the very Tuesday on which he marched to the front. It was only by great exertion that he succeeded in having his wants partially supplied. He failed to secure transportation to carry rations with his army, and had to march trusting that wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with provisions and sent to follow him.

He met with much difficulty in getting officers of experience to command divisions and brigades. His division commanders were, Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.; Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon. New Jersey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman and Miles of the regular army.

At that time Tyler was in his sixty-second year, having been graduated at the U. S. Military Academy in 1819, and appointed 2d Lieutenant of Artillery. He remained in the service as lieutenant until 1834, when he resigned, dissatisfied at President Jackson's refusal to appoint him captain in the new ordnance corps. He was the veteran of McDowell's army in 1861. The organization of that army was:—Tyler's (1st) Division, 4 brigades, 9,936 men, four batteries of artillery and a squadron of cavalry ; Hunter's (2d) Division, 2 brigades, 2,648 men, two and a half batteries of artillery, and 5 companies of cavalry ; Heintzleman's (3d) Division, 3 brigades, 9,777 men, two batteries of artillery ; Miles' (5th) Division, 2 brigades, 6,207 men, three batteries of artillery, and Runyon's (4th Reserve) Division, 5,752 men, not divided into brigades. Notwithstanding the fact that three of the division commanders—Hunter, Heintzleman and Miles had spent their lives in the military service which Tyler had left twenty-seven years before, and were not greatly his juniors in years, McDowell gave Tyler the first and largest division, and entrusted him with the honor of the advance in the movement upon the enemy. This is evidence of what may be asserted as a fact, that McDowell placed confidence in Tyler and treated him with profound respect. It hap-

pened that in two instances during the campaign, Tyler's official action met with McDowell's disapproval. The first was in relation to the engagement which Tyler brought on at Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords, July 18; and the second was the delay which occurred in Tyler's advance in the early morning of July 21. McDowell's official expressions concerning these occurrences, though not severe, created a bitterness towards him, on Tyler's part, which, though occasionally breaking out, found full vent only through the agency of his friends after his death, which occurred November 30, 1882.

Tyler opens his account of the first Bull Run by saying: "The first campaign of the War of the Rebellion, was gotten up by Gen. McDowell and his friends, and was intended to make him the hero of a short war and of a campaign begun and ended in the first battle of Bull Run. All the accounts of that battle thus far intended for history—I refer to Nicolay's and Prince de Joinville's"—(does he mean Comte de Paris?)—"were either written or inspired by General McDowell and his friends, intending, so far as possible, to shield his military reputation from the condemnation it so richly deserves." It is not necessary to comment upon

this extravagant assertion further than to say that, if true, the man must have great merits who can command so many and such able friends and historians. Tyler continues: "McDowell has been an expensive ornament to the military service; and his courtier-like services in the salon have immeasurably exceeded his military services in the field. Commencing at the head of the army on the breaking out of the late war, at the end he stood at the foot of the list—in the estimation of the army and the public." This, no doubt, is a specimen of Tyler's writing to which the editor of his memorial volume refers as having Tyler's "impassioned ring." The right name for it is slander. Having relieved himself of this spiteful tirade against a distinguished officer, who was promoted to the grade of Major-General long after the war was over and the claims of its leaders had been carefully weighed by the government and the people, Tyler, with characteristic inconsistency, closes this personal abuse by saying: "In my account of the battle of Bull Run, I shall only state what was personal to myself or the troops under my command." In other words, having said the worst I can of the man I hate, I shall now proceed to be just, and shall speak only of what is personal to myself and my command.

The assertion that the Bull Run Campaign

“was gotten up by General McDowell and his friends,” is true only in the sense that *the people* of the North are the friends referred to. In a more restricted sense, it would show that Tyler misunderstood or misrepresented the sentiment of the time. To suppose that a young general, without military prestige, without political antecedents—having never even voted or attended a political meeting, never written or made a speech on a political question in his life—unknown to the country, unacquainted even with the President or any of his cabinet before the commencement of the war, should have stirred up the public press, inflamed the public mind to force the government to order an advance into Virginia, is to give an insignificant source to a great movement. McDowell had no such commanding power as to have a campaign set on foot for his special benefit. He was simply an instrument used for purposes which had their origin quite out of his sphere and beyond the reach of his moderate influence. This campaign resulted logically from acts in the history of the country which can be attributed to no one person, to no one party. It was the resultant of great political and social forces which had—many of them—moved the nation years before the outbreak of the rebellion.

// There was an unmistakable public demand

for the advance upon Manassas in July, 1861. Even General Scott, who held out against it for a time, was at last forced to yield. Nothing but blindness or malice can explain the charge that the campaign was gotten up by McDowell and his friends for the purpose of making a hero of him. The assertion is unjust to the Northern masses, who, impatient under the wickedness and insolence of the outbreak, demanded an immediate clash of arms in vindication of outraged loyalty." The responsibility for publishing such a charge rests with Tyler's biographers.

THE ADVANCE.

Tyler says :

"In the order directing the movement of the army I was instructed to concentrate my command at or near Vienna on the night of the 15th." * * * *

He should have said on the 16th.

This mistake as to date is not a slip of the pen. It is carried out through his narrative. He says he was engaged at Blackburn's Ford the 17th ; and it is a salient point in his narrative, discussed further on, that "it was the delay of *three days* succeeding the affair at Blackburn's Ford that lost the battle of Bull Run." To get these three days, he counted back from the well-known 21st of July, and made the

affair at Blackburn's Ford come off on the 17th, instead of the 18th,

This error of dates is of no other consequence, in the present connection, than to give one of several instances of Tyler's defective memory in dealing with questions of the campaign.

Another is found in his statement of the orders under which he marched from Vienna. On this point his latest statement is that he was "to move at early dawn in the direction of Centreville, *via* Flint Hill School-house." In his testimony in 1862 (Committee on Conduct of the War, pp. 198-199), he says: "My line of march was by Vienna to Flint Hill, and from thence I had authority from General McDowell to take either route by Fairfax Court-house, or the route by Germantown, as my judgment should indicate."

The order given him will be found on page 304, Rebellion Records. It is as follows:

1. "Brigadier-General Tyler will direct his march so as to intercept the enemy's communication between Fairfax Court-house and Centreville, moving to the right or left of Germantown, as he may find most practicable.

"On reaching Centreville turnpike he will direct the march of his leading brigade either upon Centreville or Fairfax Court-house as the indication of the enemy may require. The

Second Brigade will move on the road in the direction not taken by the First. The rear brigades will be disposed of by the Division Commander as circumstances may require.

“Should he deem it best a brigade may be sent on Fairfax Court-house direct from Flint Hill.” * * * * *

It will be noticed that he was to direct his march so as “*to intercept the enemy’s communication*” between Fairfax Court-house and Centreville. To do this he was to go either to the right or left of *Germantown*—not to Fairfax Court-house—as he might see fit.

The discretionary authority for him *to send* one of the rear brigades direct on Fairfax Court-house from Flint Hill has been converted in his mind into authority for him to go there himself—which would have been inconsistent with the object of his movement, to *intercept the enemy’s communication* between the Court-house and Centreville. He omits all reference to this prime object of his march, and it may be added, he failed to accomplish it, and has never in his reports or letters explained this failure.

Apparently not appreciating the importance of the part assigned him, Tyler says:

“I moved quietly on towards Centreville, arriving in sight of that place about four o’clock in the afternoon.”

The enemy, too, bears witness to the *quietness* of the movement. Captain Del-Kemper, commanding their rearguard, says (p. 439, Rebellion Records): "The enemy seemed not disposed to press us closely, and we reached Centreville without incident worthy of note about 12 M.," and General Bonham says (p. 450, Rebellion Records): "The column thus fell back in perfect order to Centreville. The enemy not venturing to attack my rearguard."

In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Tyler, speaking of his march from Vienna, says:


"We continued our march until about four o'clock in the evening, and then bivouacked for the night. I think that was the first misfortune of our movement. I think, if we had gone on to Centreville that night, we should have been in much better condition the next day."

This failure to go to Centreville was not the *first* misfortune of our movement. An earlier one, just pointed out, was Tyler's quiet march and failure to intercept the enemy's communication.

Tyler says he was ordered by McDowell to halt and bivouac between Germantown and Centreville. But he omits to say that *he* had reported to McDowell that his troops could go

no further. McDowell reported this fact *at the time* (July 17) to Army Headquarters (see p. 305, Rebellion Records). He there stated to General Scott—"I" (McDowell) "endeavored to pursue beyond Centreville, but the men were too much exhausted to do so."

Whatever there was of misfortune in our not going to Centreville that night was due mainly to Tyler's representations of the condition of his troops.



BLACKBURN'S FORD.

Tyler says :

“On the night of the 16th [17th] a small movement of troops could be seen at Centreville ; but nothing, in my opinion intimating that there was to be any great resistance at that point, and at daybreak on the morning of the 17th [18th] it appeared to me that Centreville had been abandoned by the rebel troops, which was found to be the case, for Schenck's brigade leading, marched that morning into Centreville and occupied it without firing of a gun.”

According to both Tyler's own report (p. 310, Rebellion Records) and Richardson's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, p. 19, it was not Schenck's, but Richardson's, brigade that led the march into Centreville. Tyler says : “My division moved from its encampment at 7 A.M. At 9 A.M. Richardson's brigade reached Centreville and found that the enemy had retreated the night before.” * * *

Richardson says : * * “then on the morning of the 18th my brigade took the lead.”

* * * *

Tyler continues his narrative, saying :

“I reported the condition of things to Gen. McDowell about 7 A.M., and asked for instruc-

tions ; but up to 11 o'clock A.M. I heard nothing from the commander of the army."

On p. 312, Rebellion Records, will be found a copy of the order given Tyler, in writing. the morning of the 18th. It is as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH-
EASTERN VIRGINIA.

" *Between Germantown and Centreville,*

" July 18, 1861. 8.15 A.M.

" GENERAL :

" I have information which leads me to believe you will find no force at Centreville, and will meet with no resistance in getting there.

" Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warrenton. Do not bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas.

" I go to Heintzleman's to arrange about the plan we have talked over.

" Very respectfully, &c.,

" IRVIN McDOWELL,

" *Brigadier General.*

" *Brigadier General Tyler.*"

The receipt of this order is not denied. It was carried to Tyler by McDowell's senior aide-camp, Major—afterwards General—Wadsworth (see pp. 46-47, "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War"). McDowell's

headquarters, when that order was written, were not far from Tyler's, both being between Germantown and Centreville. It is hardly possible he did not receive it before eleven o'clock.

The route over which Tyler moved on the 18th of July, was the direct road from Centreville to Manassas Junction. That road crossed Bull Run at *Mitchell's Ford*—not Blackburn's Ford—though a road branching off to Tyler's left crossed the Run at Blackburn's Ford, a short distance below Mitchell's Ford, and led on thence, though not so directly, to Manassas Junction.

Tyler's attack covered both fords, but his artillery was directed mainly against Mitchell's Ford. These fords were in supporting distance of each other, and the passage of either could be effected only by overcoming all the resistance at both as well as the reserve in their rear. The article in the "*Post*" says: "No one can arise from the perusal of Tyler's account without feeling satisfied that the great blunder of that unfortunate campaign was, the almost unaccountable failure of McDowell to allow Gen. Tyler immediately to follow up the affair at Blackburn's Ford as the latter desired."

Immediately after writing the order of 8.15 A.M. to Tyler, McDowell went to the extreme left for the purpose alluded to in the note.

The note contains all the orders given by McDowell to Tyler on the 18th, till after the latter had, of his own motion, passed through Centreville and gone down to Bull Run, brought on an engagement and been repulsed. That affair, from beginning to end, was Tyler's, brought on, continued and ended by him in McDowell's absence; and all of Tyler's acts in relation to it, were either against McDowell's orders or without his knowledge. The claim that Tyler desired to follow up the affair at Blackburn's Ford, but was not allowed by McDowell to do so, is without foundation. Tyler's report (p. 311) written (July 27, '61), shortly after the affair, when the facts were fresh in his memory, refutes the claim and shows that *he* ordered the withdrawal, and that he had no desire to follow up the affair. On the contrary, it shows a purpose to exculpate himself for having made the attack, and to throw the responsibility on his brigade commander, Richardson. He says: "The moment Ayres opened his fire, the enemy replied with volleys which showed that the whole bottom was filled with troops, and that he had batteries established in different positions to sweep the approaches."

* * "This attack on Captain Ayres accomplished the object I desired, as it showed that the enemy was in force and disclosed the position of his batteries; and *had I been at hand the*

movement would have ended here." * * "Having satisfied myself that the enemy was in force and also as to the position of his batteries, *I ordered Colonel Richardson to withdraw his brigade.*" * * That is Tyler's official statement made at the time, of his object in going to Blackburn's Ford, of what he found there, of his withdrawal, and of his reasons for withdrawing. His sole and entire responsibility is fully confessed in his testimony, 1862, before Committee on Conduct of the War, pages 199, 200. He says: "As soon as *I* found out the condition of things *I* sent back for Ayres' battery * * and had it brought and put into position * * * *I* then took Richardson's brigade and filed it down there to see what there was in the bottom. * * *I* sent some skirmishers into the woods. * * *I* saw an opening where we could have a chance to get in a couple of pieces of artillery, and *I* ordered Captain Ayres" * * The substance of Tyler's own report and testimony is that *he* directed everything. The conclusion from all the facts is unavoidable—that it was Beauregard, not McDowell, who prevented him from going on. Richardson says (p. 313), after the disastrous repulse of the 12th N. Y. Volunteers: "I now reported to General Tyler, and proposed to him to make a charge with the three remaining regiments for the purpose of carrying the

enemy's position. The General replied that the enemy were in large force and strongly fortified, and a further attack was unnecessary." In addition to the foregoing official reports, Tyler made a sworn statement on this subject. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (p. 200), given January 20, 1862, he says further: "I ordered Captain Ayres to take a couple of howitzers and go into that opening and throw some canister shot into the woods. The very moment he came into battery, it appeared to me that there were five thousand muskets fired at once. It appears by Beauregard's report he had seventeen regiments in front there. Having satisfied myself that the enemy was in force and also as to the position of his batteries, I ordered Colonel Richardson to withdraw his brigade, which was skillfully, though unwillingly accomplished." * * *

And now, some twenty years after these occurrences, and in the face of his own testimony and official reports, Tyler, apparently having learned nothing and forgotten much of what he knew concerning them, says (p. 54, Memoirs): "From what I knew then and ascertained afterwards, I think my four brigades could have whipped Beauregard before sundown."

* * "When the skirmish commenced at Blackburn's Ford, Beauregard was surprised, and at that time he could not before sunset have

concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field." Fortunately he gives his reason for this extravagant afterthought. It is, that "the entire South Carolina contingent of Beauregard's army was down in the Occoquan region; its mission was to protect the route of Fredericksburg, and it was a kind of independent command under its South Carolina general, and not within striking distance for a battle on the seventeenth" (eighteenth it ought to be). This is an unaccountable error. It shows in what dense ignorance of the campaign Tyler lived and died. The Records of the Rebellion, Vol. II., hereinbefore referred to, published some time before Tyler's death, contain the reports of Generals Beauregard, Longstreet, Bonham and their subordinates (pp. 440 to 458). They prove that the South Carolina contingent, which Tyler says was a kind of independent command under its South Carolina general, and could not be brought within striking distance, was actually *in his immediate front*!—that the 2d, 3d, 7th and 8th South Carolina regiments under Gen. Bonham was the force upon which Tyler's artillery commenced the attack. The other South Carolina regiment was in D. R. Jones' brigade at the next ford, a short distance below. "The South Carolina contingent" was not only in front of Tyler on the 18th, but four regiments of it under Gen. Bonham had been in his immediate

front at Fairfax Court House when the latter was at Fall's Church. It was these South Carolina troops Tyler was expected to intercept on his first day's march ; and, strange as it may appear in the light of Tyler's latest assertion that "the entire South Carolina contingent was down in the Occoquan region," *he was told* at the time he arrived at Centreville that they were in his front. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, January 20, 1862, p. 199, Tyler says: "On arriving at Centreville I found that the enemy had evacuated their fortifications and that Cox's division, as I was told by their people, had passed over Stonebridge, and *Bonham, with the South Carolina and Georgia troops, had passed down by Blackburn's Ford.*" It is not necessary to pile up evidence on this point.

I was McDowell's Adjutant-General in that campaign. After he had gone to the left of his line on the morning of the 18th, I went to the front and arrived at Tyler's advanced position, overlooking Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords, just before he sent Ayres forward into the skirt of woods along the Run. Desiring to learn all I could about the enemy, I accompanied the cavalry under Brackett which went as support for Ayres' guns. When the enemy opened upon us it seemed to me, as it did to Tyler, that "there were five thousand muskets fired

at once." Ayres saw instantly that his command could not exist long in such musketry fire, and without waiting for orders he promptly limbered up; and Brackett, who had dismounted his men, remounted them and all went at full speed across the open bottom-land to the high ground in rear whence Tyler had sent them. I am quite certain that no one present thought at the time that Beauregard could not concentrate 1,500 men, that Tyler with his four brigades could whip him before sundown, or even that all of McDowell's army, if concentrated for the effort, could go to Manassas junction by way of Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords.

Foreseeing the bad effect Tyler's repulse would have upon the troops, and wishing to avert the depression which he knew would follow from Tyler's having been driven back, McDowell, when he learned of the affair after it was all over, gave Tyler verbal orders to reoccupy the high ground where his command had been engaged. But Tyler, from misunderstanding the orders, or from lack of disposition to do anything more there, did not carry out the verbal orders, and just after midnight (18th-19th) McDowell gave him written orders as follows (p. 306, Records of the Rebellion) :

“HEADQUARTERS, ETC.,

“*Centreville,*

“July 19, 1861. 12.30 A.M.

“BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYLER,

Commanding 1st Division :

“There seems to be a misunderstanding on your part of the order issued for a brigade of your division to be posted in observation on the road leading to the place where your command was engaged yesterday, July 18. It was intended that the movement should have been made long before this. The train of subsistence came up long ago. I have given no order or instruction of a change in this matter. I thought that the brigade was posted as desired until just now, when Major Brown, who is just returned from your headquarters, informs me that no action under these orders has been taken. Give orders which will cause the brigade to be there, where the previous instructions indicated, by dawn this morning.

“Very respectfully,

“IRVIN McDOWELL.”

As to Beauregard having been surprised by Tyler, there is abundant proof to the contrary. He was kept informed of what passed in Washington, knew of our advance, knew the organization and composition of McDowell's army, etc. In his report of August, 1861, p.

440, he says: "Opportunely informed of the determination of the enemy to advance on Manassas, my advance brigades, on the night of the 16th of July, were made aware of the impending movement." In his report of July 17, to Jefferson Davis, he says, p. 339: "I have fallen back on the line of Bull Run, and will make a stand at *Mitchell's Ford*." His special orders, No. 100, from Manassas Junction, dated July 8, p. 447, 448, show the steps he took ten days before to meet the very attack by which Tyler claims he was surprised. Beauregard's report, p. 440, says, on the morning of the 18th of July (the day when Tyler attacked Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords): "My troops resting on Bull Run, from Stone Bridge to Union Mills, a distance of about eight miles, were posted as follows," and he proceeds to specify the forces of artillery, infantry and cavalry, stationed at six of the crossings of the stream, and the reserves held to support the troops at Mitchell's, Blackburn's and McLean's fords, which a bend in the river enabled him to place about equidistant from all. His own headquarters were near the Reserve. He says further: "On the morning of the 18th, finding the enemy was assuming a threatening attitude, in addition to the regiments whose positions have already been stated, I ordered up from Camp Pickens,

as a reserve in rear of Bonham, the effective men of six companies of Kelly's 8th Louisiana Volunteers, and Kirkland's 11th North Carolina Volunteers, which having arrived the night before en route for Winchester, I had halted in view of the existing necessities of the service." The foregoing extracts show that Beauregard knew when and by what routes we were coming; that to meet us, he had posted his whole army behind Bull Run, his Reserves and his own headquarters near the places which Tyler attacked. Yet years after comes a statement from Tyler, that at that time Beauregard could not, before sunset, have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field, that he had surprised him, and that he with his four brigades could have whipped Beauregard before sundown. Tyler's command consisted of four brigades—fifteen regiments of infantry, four batteries of artillery—some of the guns of heavy caliber, and many of them rifled, and a squadron of cavalry—an effective force for duty of over 10,000 men—an army in itself. It will be noticed in McDowell's order of the 18th, to Tyler, heretofore quoted, he says: "I go to Heintzleman's to arrange about the plan of moving against the enemy's right," which plan as the note says, he had talked over with Tyler. If that plan had been acted upon by McDowell, as Tyler supposed it

would be, Tyler could no longer have been in the advance. But being in advance at the time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears to have resolved, practically, to take the direction of the campaign into his own hands. So he moved against Longstreet at Black-

ERRATA.

Page 33: Eighth line from top, for *North* Caroli
read *South* Carolina.

thoughts. Out of reach of his commanding officer, he found as he claims, a state of things which warranted him in assuming the responsibility of a different course from the one ordered. He had all the advantages of position—a commanding bank on his side, skirted with timber and having open ground beyond. He says that the enemy was surprised, could not have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field before sunset, and that he could have whipped the whole of Beauregard's army before sundown. Then, in the name of everything that is soldierly, why did he not do it? According to his own account he had the whole field to himself. No superior authority near.

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would be, Tyler could no longer have been in the advance. But being in advance at the time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears to have resolved, practically, to take the direction of the campaign into his own hands. So he moved against Longstreet at Blackburn's Ford, and what he forgot, against Bonham and the North Carolina troops at Mitchell's Ford.

Having refuted Tyler's claims concerning facts and circumstances attending his attack on the 18th, let us see how he would appear if the case had been as he states it in his memoirs, and whether it is not doing him a kindness to prove the error of his after-thoughts. Out of reach of his commanding officer, he found as he claims, a state of things which warranted him in assuming the responsibility of a different course from the one ordered. He had all the advantages of position—a commanding bank on his side, skirted with timber and having open ground beyond. He says that the enemy was surprised, could not have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field before sunset, and that he could have whipped the whole of Beauregard's army before sundown. Then, in the name of everything that is soldierly, why did he not do it? According to his own account he had the whole field to himself. No superior authority near.

He had incurred the responsibility of opening an engagement against orders. Yet at the head of some ten thousand effective men of all arms, without using one-quarter of them, he allowed himself to be repulsed, defeated, driven back, leaving his dead and prisoners, and between one and two hundred stand of arms in the hands of the enemy (p. 447). McDowell, as already stated, was far away, knew nothing of the affair, and did not reach the ground until he met the troops returning to Centreville ridge late in the afternoon, when it was all over. If Tyler attacked at all, he should have done so in force and held his ground, and thus enabled McDowell to determine whether or not to follow up the blow with the whole army.

The truth is, there *was* a surprise at Blackburn's Ford on the 18th of July, 1861, but it was Tyler, not Beauregard, who was surprised. Twenty years after, in the bitterness and blindness of ill-will towards his Commanding General, and apparently in ignorance of what he ought to have known and what he might have learned from the records, especially his own contributions to them, if he did not know—his friends are left to choose between admitting that, in his own judgment and against orders, he went unwittingly against the center of Beauregard's entire army; or that with a fine army

of his own, he submitted to a defeat at the hands of part of the enemy's forces. That he was defeated is certain.

The consequences of that defeat were serious. The effect was plainly seen. The feeling was universal that things had gone against us. The 12th New York Volunteers were paralyzed by the shock, and the depressing effect of the repulse was not confined to them; the whole army felt it. The 4th Pennsylvania Infantry, and the 8th New York battery, their terms having expired, went home as the battle of the 21st was about to begin. The troops began the advance from the Potomac, with a dread of being sent against "masked batteries." They felt that their fears on this point were now realized; and they were so in fact, for they had been sent against "masked batteries." The possibility of making a front attack was thus destroyed by Tyler himself. He reported soon after the affair that he found the place "was strongly fortified, and the enemy in large force," p. 313. McDowell said in his report, p. 308: "If it were needed, the experience of the 18th instant shows we cannot, with this description of force, attempt to carry batteries such as now before us;" and Beauregard, p. 447, says: "The effect of this day's conflict was to satisfy the enemy he could not force a passage across Bull Run in the face of our troops, and

led him into the flank movement of the 21st of July, and the battle of Manassas.”

As a matter of fact, there were no works immediately at *Blackburn's Ford*. The belief at the time, however, was that it was strongly fortified, as Tyler thought, and it will be seen from the reports of General Bonham's officers that the adjoining position at Mitchell's Ford was fortified, and had been for some time.

The purport of our reports and reconnaissances at the time was to the effect that of all the crossings over Bull Run, within our reach, including the Stone Ridge—said to be mined—the first unfortified one was the Sudley Spring Ford, where we crossed July 21 (p. 330, Report of Barnard, Chief of Engineers, of McDowell's army).

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN, JULY 21, 1861.

The task of whipping Beauregard's army, which Tyler, in the face of his failure, boasts he could have performed with four brigades on the 18th, was not undertaken by McDowell until the 21st, and then he was defeated.

The *Evening Post*, quoting Tyler, says: “It was the delay of three days succeeding the affair at Blackburn's Ford that lost the battle of Bull Run; and for what purpose this delay occurred no proper explanation has been or can be made.”

It may be repeated here that the delay was from the evening of the 18th till 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st—*two* instead of *three* days. When before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, January 20, 1862, Tyler was asked what "caused the disaster of that day?" July 21. He, under oath said, "Want of discipline and instruction in the troops." "Were there any other more proximate causes than that?" asked the Committee. Here was an opportunity, if not an invitation, for Tyler to assert his "three" days' delay at Centreville, if that had been in his mind as a cause, but he did not give delay as a cause; on the contrary, he gave as the "more proximate" cause "want of instruction and professional knowledge among the officers, *the company and regimental officers.*" During these "three" days Tyler asserts "there were no movements made to ascertain the force or position of the enemy, and the army had its full provision of seven days when it started from Washington, and was in no way in want of supplies of any kind."

The consequences of the two days' delay at Centreville, the causes of the delay, and the responsibility for that delay, are important and independent questions.

Johnson's army, over eight thousand strong,

joined Beauregard between the night of Thursday, the 18th, and the evening of Sunday, the 21st. His leading brigade under Jackson arrived on the 19th. Bee's brigade and Johnston in person arrived on the 20th, and the remainder reached the field on the 21st, in time to take part in the action. General Scott, who controlled both McDowell and Patterson, was responsible for this change in the relative strength of the contending armies. The campaign he required McDowell to make was based upon the condition that Johnston should not join Beauregard without having Patterson on his heels. McDowell would not have been justified in conducting his operations upon the assumption that the condition upon which the campaign was predicated by the General-in-Chief, was going to be violated. Nor did he know, until the 21st, during the battle, though he suspected it, that Johnston's forces had joined Beauregard. It must be admitted that it would have been better for McDowell if he could have executed on the 19th or 20th the plan of battle he acted upon on the 21st, and still better, perhaps, if he could have done so before Tyler's *fiasco* on the 18th. But that was not possible. Neither the preparation of his plan nor the state of his supplies permitted it. He did not form the plan, nor did he have the information upon which to base it, until

the 20th. He did not learn until the night of the 18th that the enemy was going to defend the line of Bull Run. If the state of his supplies had permitted, he might have attempted to force that line by a direct attack on the 19th or 20th, as Tyler did on the 18th, but such an enterprise would have given no fair promise, and Tyler destroyed all possibility of its success by his disastrous failure on the 18th. Under all the circumstances a flank movement, instead of a direct attack, was an essential part of any plan which might be adopted. McDowell's first intention was to turn the enemy's right, but that intention had to be abandoned on the 18th. Tyler says that between the 18th and 21st, "there were no movements made to ascertain the force or position of the enemy." Let the truth of what was done speak for itself. In his report, p. 330, Barnard, the Chief Engineer, says: "At my interview with the Commanding General that evening, he informed me that he had convinced himself that the nature of the country to the left, or southward of Manassas, was unfit for the operations of a large army. I told him I would endeavor the next day to obtain such information as would enable him to decide on his further movement." No one deserves censure for the time which was consumed in obtaining that information. No army during the war had

such an array of military engineering latent as McDowell had at that time. Barnard was the Chief, and under him were Woodbury, Wright, B. S. Alexander, A. W. Whipple, Abbott, Putnam, Prime, Houston, Snyder and O'Rorke, of the Engineer Corps of the regular army. Their ability and zeal are beyond dispute. They devoted themselves to the examinations and reconnaissances for a proper plan of attack. In seeking a route to the right, Barnard reports, p. 330: "I, *on the 19th*, followed up the valley of Cub Run, until we reached a point west of 10° North, and about four miles in an air line from Centreville, near which we struck a road, which we believed to lead to the fords" (near Sudley Springs). "Following it for a short distance, we encountered the enemy's patrols. As we were most anxious to avoid attracting the enemy's attention to our designs in this quarter, we did not care to pursue the reconnaissance farther. We had seen enough to convince us of the perfect *practicability of the route*. To make more certain of *the fords*, however, Captain Woodbury proposed to return at night (that was the night of 19th), and with a few Michigan woodsmen from Colonel Sherman's brigade, to endeavor to find them. On returning to camp it was determined to send Captain Wright and Lieut. Snyder, engineers, with Captain Woodbury.

At the same time the Commanding General directed Captain Whipple, Topographical Engineer, and Lieut. Prime, engineer, to make a night reconnaissance of the Run between Warrenton bridge and Blackburn's Ford. Both these night expeditions failed. It was found the enemy occupied the woods too strongly on our side of the run to permit the reconnaissances to be accomplished. It was not our policy to drive in his pickets until we were in motion to attack. On laying before you the information obtained, the Commanding General believed himself justified in adopting the following plan of attack, which was *decided upon on the 20th*," that is, after the reconnaissances of the night of the 19th.

On the 20th, McDowell issued orders for the advance to begin at half-past two on the morning of the 21st. It was not possible for him to form that plan or act upon it any sooner than he did. No critic, to this day, I believe, not even Tyler, has claimed that the plan was not good. What the result would have been of acting earlier upon a worse plan, no one can say with any certainty.

Tyler says: "The army had its full provision for seven days when it started from Washington, and was in no way in want of supplies of any kind" on the 18th. The Record contradicts him. The troops marched from the

Potomac on the 16th with *three days'* rations in their haversacks. Wagons were to follow the next day containing *five days'* rations, but they met with difficulties and delay. Some of them arrived in time to distribute supplies to divisions on the evening of the 18th, others not until the 19th. The three days' rations with which the troops began the advance on the 16th ought to have lasted until the afternoon of the 19th, but, on account of the inexperience of the men, they were exhausted on the 18th. The reports of the Chief Commissary, Clarke and his subordinates explain this matter, p. 336 to 344, Rebellion Records. Lieut. Hawkins, in charge of one of the three supply trains, says, p. 343, that on his arrival "there was immediate necessity for the distribution of the rations;" and the officer in charge of another of the trains, Lieut. Curtis, p. 340, says of his distribution on the 19th: "I found the men in almost a starving condition." Heintzleman and others confirm this, and Schenck's report, (p. 360) shows that his brigade of Tyler's division was unfed on the 21st.

An advance of the army beyond Centreville was not practicable until the supply trains came up and their contents were distributed. The distribution was completed *to divisions* on the 19th, and on the 20th McDowell ordered, p. 325: "The commanders of divisions will give

the necessary orders that an equal distribution of subsistence stores on hand be made immediately to the different companies in their respective commands, so that they shall be provided for the same number of days, and that the same be cooked and put in the haversacks of the men. The subsistence stores now in the possession of each division, with the fresh beef that can be drawn from the commissary, must last to include the 23d instant."

This was the first campaign of the war. The troops were not soldiers, but civilians in uniform ; most of them in service only for three months. Giving due weight to all the circumstances, there was no culpable delay at Centreville, and the time spent there between the evening of the 18th and 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st, was necessary to replenish the exhausted haversacks of the men and to gain information upon which to form a proper plan of battle.

The enemy was strongly posted along Bull Run, his right at Union Mills, and his left at the "Stonebridge," where the Warrenton turnpike crosses the stream. His line was eight miles long. Centreville, around which McDowell's army was concentrated, was nearly opposite the center of Beauregard's line, and only about three or four miles from it.

There was no misunderstanding as to the plan of battle. The parts of the different divisions were clearly set forth in McDowell's general order No. 22 of July 20, p. 226, and explanations were given in detail at a conference on the evening of the 20th, at which division and brigade commanders were present.

After explaining the situation and the object to be accomplished, the order says: "The First Division (General Tyler), with the exception of Richardson's brigade, will move at 2.30 A.M. precisely, on the Warrenton turnpike, to threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not open fire until full daybreak.

"The Second Division (Hunter's) will move from its camp at 2 A.M. precisely, and led by Captain Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after passing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass the Bull Run stream above the lower ford at Sudley Springs, and then turning down to the left, descend the stream and clear away the enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and bridge. It will then bear off to the right to make room for the succeeding division,

"The Third Division (Heintzleman's) will march at 2.30 A.M. and follow the road taken by the Second Division (Hunter's), but will cross at the lower ford after it has been turned as above, and then going to the left, take place between the stream and the Second Division.

“The Fifth Division (Miles’) will take position on the Centreville Heights (Richardson’s brigade will, for the time, form part of this division and will continue in its present position). One brigade will be in the village and one near the present station of Richardson’s brigade. This division will threaten Blackburn’s Ford, and will remain in reserve at Centreville.

“These movements may lead to the gravest results, and commanders of divisions should bear in mind the immense consequences involved.”

When this order was issued Sherman’s and Schenck’s brigades of Tyler’s division were in camp in advance of Centreville, on the Warrenton turnpike, which led directly to the enemy’s left at the Stone-Bridge, about two and a half miles away. Keyes’ brigade of Tyler’s division was just in rear of Centreville, a mile behind Sherman; behind him, Hunter’s division, on his left, Miles’ division, and in rear of Miles, Heintzleman’s division. It was only about a mile from the camps of Sherman and Schenck to the point where Hunter and Heintzleman were to leave the turnpike and take the country road to the right. Ordering Tyler, who occupied the turnpike (over a part of which all in turn had to move) to march at “2.30 A.M. *precisely*,” McDowell’s object was to have him clear the pike as far as the

turn off, so as not to delay Hunter and Heintzle-
mann. That was fully understood at the con-
ference held on the night of the 20th. Tyler
had to move Sherman's and Schenck's brigades
one mile along the pike to accomplish the ob-
ject of opening the roads to the following divi-
sions. Yet, without any opposition from the
enemy, his advance was so slow as to hold
Hunter and Heintzleman some four hours on
the mile or two of the turnpike between their
camps and the road on which they were to
turn off for the flank march. There is abund-
ant proof of this fact in the official reports
printed in Records of the Rebellion, and in the
testimony before the Committee on the Con-
duct of the War, and the Committee itself con-
firms the assertion in its report. It is not
necessary to cite any other witness than
Tyler himself. While not frankly admit-
ting the delay, he was not able before the
Committee to deny or disprove it. He said,
p. 202 :

Q. "Were the rest of the divisions delayed
by your movement?"

A. "They were not, more than absolutely
necessary, under the circumstances."

Q. "What time did your movement com-
mence?"

A. "At half-past two o'clock."

Q. "You were to advance, how far?"

A. "To the Stone-Bridge, about two and a half miles."

Q. "At what time did the portion of the division under your command reach Stone-bridge?"

A. "It reached there by six o'clock, perhaps a quarter before six."

By this testimony from Tyler himself, he, with no opposition from the enemy, and no obstruction in the way, was about three hours and a half marching two miles and a half over a good turnpike.

The Committee, however, went a little further, and asked, pp. 202, 203 :

Q. "At what time did the rear of your division—I do not mean to include Keyes' brigade, but the rear of that which was with you that morning—pass the point where Hunter and Heintzleman turned off to the right?"

A. "We passed there before four o'clock."

Q. "Or in two hours after you started?"


A. "Yes, Sir!"

The point from which the part of his division here mentioned (Sherman's and Schenck's brigades) marched, and the point where Hunter and Heintzleman turned off, was *one mile*. Tyler marched that distance in *two hours*, and yet he went to his grave with a grievance because McDowell said in his report, p. 318: "There was delay in the First Division getting out of

its camp on the road, and the other divisions were, in consequence, between two and three hours behind the time appointed—a great misfortune, as events turned out,” and because further, that in his testimony, McDowell, p. 42, refused to retract this part of his report, and said: “General Tyler has written me a letter complaining that my report does him injustice, and asking me to set him right in reference to this matter of delay. Under the circumstances, I did not feel that I could make any change.”

In view of Tyler's abuse and criticism of McDowell, the commander, it is proper to look for a moment at the part played in that battle by Tyler himself, McDowell's second in command, as well as his critic. He says, with his division alone, he could have whipped Beauregard's entire army before sundown on the 18th, if McDowell had not prevented. That boast has been disposed of. Certainly McDowell did not prevent him from fighting on the 21st. What help did he give toward whipping Beauregard on that day? It has already been shown that he employed the three and a half hours between 2.30 and 6 A.M. in marching two and a half miles to the vicinity of the Stone bridge on the Warrenton turnpike. It was under cover of the demonstration he was to make at that point that Hunter and

Heintzelman were to effect their flank march and turn the enemy's left.



POSITION OF TYLER FROM 6 A.M. UNTIL ABOUT 12 M. ON 21ST.

The rebel position at Stone-Bridge was defended by General Evans. Tyler's report, written six days after the battle, when everything was comparatively fresh in his mind, and when he was not making an attack on his commander and the plan of battle, says (pp. 348, 349, Rebellion Records):

“* * * Soon after getting into position we discovered that the enemy had a heavy bat-

tery, with infantry in support, commanding both the road and bridge approaches, on which both Ayres and Carlisle, at different times, tried the effect of their guns without success, and a careful examination of the banks of Bull-Run satisfying me that they were impracticable for purpose of artillery, these batteries had to remain comparatively useless until such time as Hunter's column might clear the approach by a movement on the opposite bank. During this period of waiting the 30-pounder was occasionally used with considerable effect against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which could be seen from time to time moving in the direction of Hunter's column and out of the range of ordinary guns." * * *

Twenty years later this condition of affairs had changed in Tyler's mind. In his memoir, traducing McDowell, he says :

"The enemy had a force guarding the bridge, but not so strong that a passage could not have been forced at any moment. He had a battery of light guns there in the early part of the day, but they were soon driven off by Ayres' battery and the heavy eighteen-pounder gun commanded by Lieutenant Lyford."

So we see that the "*heavy*" battery and supports on which, according to Tyler, in 1862, Ayres and Carlisle fired in vain, and finally ceased firing, became by the same authority, in

1881, "a '*light*' battery, which was soon driven off by our fire!" and, that, the waiting for Hunter's column to clear the opposite bank was not necessary, as we could have "forced the passage at any moment!"

In this instance the latest statement is the correct one. The truth is the Stone-Bridge was defended by a fractional brigade consisting of a regiment and a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and two pieces of light artillery.

Tyler's demonstration was so feeble that Evans was not long deceived by it. The latter says in his report, p. 559: It was not later than eight o'clock "when I perceived that it was not the intention of the enemy to attack me in my present position, but had commenced his movement to turn my left flank. I at once decided to quit my position and to meet him in his flank movement. leaving the skirmishers of the Fourth Regiment of S. C. Volunteers, supported by the reserve of two companies to keep him engaged. I sent word to Colonel Phil. St. George Cocke that I had abandoned my position at the bridge and was advancing to attack the enemy at the crossing of the Warrenton turnpike and the Manassas road. Observing carefully the movements of the enemy,* I was

*The enemy here referred to is Hunter's, not Tyler's division.

able to form my line of attack directly in his front, covered by a grove of woods, by 9 o'clock a. m." It thus appears that the division which on the 18th could have whipped Beauregard's army before sundown, was confronted *before 8 a. m.* on the 21st by some fifteen companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and two of artillery, and *after 8 o'clock* was held in check "till about noon"—p 369—by the skirmishers of the 4th S. C. Volunteers, supported by *two* companies of that regiment, *four companies in all*. This, in the face of orders to Tyler from McDowell, the delivery of which is proved by the records, to "*press forward the attack*," and in the face, too, of his duty in the matter, as admitted in his memoirs, p. 57, where he says, that when Hunter and Heintzelman had "attacked and forced the enemy to the vicinity of Stone Bridge," I "was to force the passage of Bull Run at that point and attack the enemy in flank." It does not appear, nor does Tyler claim that he did press the attack in response to McDowell's orders. In fact Tyler, under oath, denied, but subsequently admitted, that he had received those orders. His testimony is as follows: January 20, 1862, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War—"I did not see General McDowell on the field, and I did not receive any order from him during that day, p. 201. * * *

“I received no orders from General McDowell after I left him Saturday night,” p. 203.

“*Question* : Did you receive from General McDowell, through his aid, Mr. Kingsbury, orders to make a more rapid advance ?

“*Answer* : No, Sir ! I did not, p. 206.

January 22d, General Daniel Tyler, re-examined. “The witness said : I made one mistake in my testimony when before the Committee on Monday last. I then stated that I received no orders from General McDowell during the day of the battle of Bull-Run. That was an error. I did receive an order from him about 11 o'clock in the morning to press the attack.”

He says, “*about* 11 o'clock.” If the exact time could be ascertained it would be found that it was before eleven o'clock. But be that as it may, the order was to “*press forward his attack !*” The how and the where were absolutely at Tyler's discretion. He could apply his troops as he judged best ; and if the enemy could be driven off and the passage be forced at any moment, as he would seem to intimate should have been done, there was nothing to keep him from doing it. The simple, emphatic, but general order about 11 A. M., was to “*press forward his attack.*” Under this order, and in the exercise of his discretion, Tyler did not attempt to force the passage of the bridge,

which was then defended by only four companies.

Let us see what Tyler did with his division in this affair. Sherman says in his official report, pp. 368-9—after reaching his position near the Stone-Bridge 6 A. M. : “here the brigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and remained quietly in position till after 10 A. M. The enemy remained very quiet,” &c., “There we remained till we heard the musketry fire across Bull-Run, showing that the head of Colonel Hunter’s column was engaged. The firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was driving before him the enemy till *about noon, when it became certain the enemy had come to a stand, and that our forces on the other side of Bull-Run were all engaged—artillery and infantry.* Here you (Tyler) sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade to the assistance of Colonel Hunter.

“*Early in the day, when reconnoitering the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a bluff in our front, cross the stream, and show himself in the open field ; and inferring we could cross over at the same point, I sent forward a company as skirmishers and followed with the whole brigade. We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met no opposition in ascending the steep bluff opposite.*”

This shows that Sherman knew “early in the

day" that he could cross the stream, but Tyler's orders for him to do so were not given until "about noon, when it became certain the enemy had come to a stand and that our forces on the other side were all engaged—artillery and infantry."

Surely this was not pressing forward the attack?

Tyler's division was the one of the three active divisions which had the shortest line to the battle-field (say 3 or 4 miles), and should have done the most fighting. The object of the long and tiresome march (some twelve miles) of Hunter and Heintzelman, was by turning the enemy's left to open the way for Tyler's command, fresh and *en masse*, to reach the field of battle by a single stride. But it turned out that the divisions which did the marching had also to do most of the fighting.

To return to Sherman: crossing the Run, he says: "I learned that General McDowell was on the field. I sought him out, and received his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy." Though his brigade took an active part in the later phases of the action, Sherman saw nothing more of Tyler during the battle. Tyler says, in his report, p. 349, "I ordered Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, to cross Bull-Run, and to support the two columns already in action. Colonel Sherman, as appears by his report,

crossed the Run without opposition, and after encountering a party of the enemy flying before Hunter's forces, found General McDowell, and received his orders to join in the pursuit. The subsequent operations of this brigade and its able commander having been under your own eye and direction, I shall not follow its movements any further."


All of this time Tyler was not only under the obligations of the general plan of battle, but was under the special obligation of the order he had received, to press the attack. Yet he nowhere admits that he acted upon that order, on the contrary he still acted upon his own judgment. He says in his report—p. 349: "*As soon as it was discovered that Hunter's division had been arrested, I ordered up Keyes' brigade.*" Was it pressing the attack, or was it soldiership, if there had been no such orders, lying on the flank of an inferior force of the enemy to wait within the sound of Hunter's musketry for his division to be arrested? "I ordered Keyes' brigade to follow Sherman, *accompanying the movement in person*, as I saw it must necessarily place me on the left of our line, *the best possible position, &c.* I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman's brigade," says Tyler. McDowell's adjutant General was sent to find Tyler and hurry him into action. *En route* he passed

Sherman's brigade ; met Tyler while Keyes' brigade was still marching by flank ; told him that we were victorious, to form line to the left and advance up the slope in front. Tyler continues in his report, p. 394 : "The charge was here ordered and the 2nd Maine and 3rd Connecticut regiments, which were opposed to this portion of the enemy's line, pressed forward to the top of the hill until they reached the buildings held by the enemy ; drove them out, and for a moment had them in possession. At this point, finding the brigade under the fire of a strong force behind breast-works, *the order was given to march by the left flank across an open field until the whole line was sheltered by the right bank of Bull-Run, along which the march was continued, &c.* The march was conducted for a considerable distance below the Stone-Bridge, &c." Keyes, in his report, p. 353, fixes the hour at which the first, and it may be said the last, active service of his brigade was rendered in the fight. He says—after describing his crossing of the Run:—"At about 2 P. M. General Tyler ordered me to take a battery on a height in front." After the attempt to do that, Keyes says in his report : "I ordered the Maine regiment to face to the left flank and move to a wooded slope across an open field, to which point I followed them. The balance of the brigade soon rejoined

me, and after a few moments rest, I again put it in motion and moved forward to find another opportunity to charge." This movement forward is the one "sheltered by the right bank of Bull-Run, already mentioned by Tyler, and this is the brigade which Tyler accompanied "in person, to the best possible position." Why he sent Keyes under the bluff to find another "opportunity to charge," is not disclosed by the records of the rebellion. The fact is, that after that one "charge" was made by Keyes' brigade, about 2 P. M. it filed off and marched along, under the bluff, and did no more fighting. Keyes confirms this. He says in his report, p. 354: "I continued my march and sent my Aide, Lieut. Walter, to the rear* to inquire of General McDowell how the day was going? The discontinuance of the firing in our lines becoming more and more apparent, I inclined to the right, and after marching six hundred or seven hundred yards farther, I was met by Lieut. E. Upton, Aide to General Tyler, and ordered to file to the right, as our troops were retreating. I moved on at an ordinary pace, and fell into the retreating column. * * * * "At the moment I received the order to retreat and for some time afterwards, it (his brigade) was in as good order as in the morning

* McDowell was in front.

on the road." Military readers, especially those who are acquainted with the Bull-Run affair, can analyze the foregoing facts for themselves. It may be added that Keyes' brigade of "about 2,500 men," as he reported it, shows:—killed, no officers, 19 enlisted men;



FIELD ABOUT TIME UNION RETREAT BEGAN, JULY 21st.

wounded, 4 officers and 46 enlisted men. Sherman's brigade which fought under McDowell's personal orders, lost:—killed, 3 officers and 117 enlisted men; wounded, 15 officers, 193 enlisted men.

Neither Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division nor Tyler's Artillery, crossed Bull-Run during the battle. After 8 o'clock the Stone-Bridge was defended by only a handful of skirmishers. The turnpike was obstructed by some fallen trees. Ordinary vigor and industry would have carried the bridge and cleared the pile in a few minutes. Tyler testifies that about 10 A. M. he received orders to press the attack. He had pushed his division, or merely the fine regular batteries of Ayers and Carlisle into the contest, as late even as 2 o'clock, but might have saved the day and averted the consequences of his delay in the morning. Tyler's three brigades, Sherman's, Keyes' and Schenck's were from 6 o'clock in the morning concentrated near the Stone-Bridge, in front of Evans until about 8 A. M. and on his flank and not more than a mile from it, after he left the Stone-Bridge and formed a line of battle perpendicular to Tyler's front—which he had done by 10 A. M., to resist the attack of Hunter and Heintzelman. Tyler was on the ground with these three fresh brigades and his artillery in hand and with McDowell's orders to press the attack and was informed of the progress of the flanking divisions by his staff officers who observed their movements from tree-tops, as Tyler says in his report. What he did under these circumstances is shown in the records of which an outline

has been given. His own services in that battle do not justify him, to say the least of it, in criticising McDowell. Except in the one particular of the delay in the morning, McDowell made no complaint against Tyler on the 21st, though he fully understood the facts in the case. The battle was lost, and he chose to let the blame rest upon his own shoulders rather than place any part of it upon his subordinates.

The object of this article is to repel the direct and outrageous attack made upon McDowell, not to praise him. But the occasion seems appropriate for citing an analysis of him, made by Secretary Chase in a letter to a friend, dated Sept. 4, 1862. (Warden's "account of the private and public services of Salmon P. Chase.")

"McDowell has been unfortunate, but he is a loyal, brave, truthful, capable officer. He is a disciplinarian. While he never hesitated to appropriate private property of rebels to public use, he suppressed, as far as possible, private marauding as incompatible with the laws of civilized war, and equally incompatible with the efficiency of troops. Then he never drinks, or smokes, or chews, or indulges in any kind of license. He is serious and earnest. He resorts to no acts of popularity. He has no political aims, and perhaps not any very pronounced political opinions, except the convic-

tion that this war sprung from the influences of slavery, and that whenever slavery stands in the way of successful prosecution, slavery must get out of the way. He is too indifferent in manner. His officers are sometimes alienated by it. He is too purely military in his intercourse with his soldiers. There is an apparent hauteur—no, that is not the word—rough indifference expresses better the idea, in his way towards them, that makes it hard for them to feel any warm personal sentiment towards him, unless they find, what they hitherto have not found, that he leads them successfully, and the honor of serving under him compensates for their grief.”

The communication in the *Post* says: “The true and full history of the War of the Rebellion cannot be written until sufficient time has elapsed to allow the many diaries, letters, and private papers of the chief participants in its stirring scenes to be made accessible by their death.” Diaries, letters, &c., are valuable data for history, but as much cannot be said for *recollections* recorded twenty years after stirring scenes, especially if they are prepared without referring to the reports, diaries, &c., made at the time. Death is valuable to history by giving to the public the diaries, letters, &c., of participants in stirring military scenes, and also by putting an end to the new versions of those

scenes which the participants issue from time to time as they pass on in life. Vanity, interest and prejudice work against memory. The operations of war appeal strongly to the imagination, and latter day recollections in some instances illuminate, in others, obscure the truth.



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